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I.

Introduction

A. Background

Directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) is a special type of insurance
which provides coverage for losses arising from claims made against directors and officers of
corporations.1 Legal problems relating to D&O insurance have created significant issues in the
U.S. for many years.2 Due to the high number of securities lawsuits in the U.S., corporate
managers are exposed to huge financial risk in their roles as directors and officers.3 D&O
insurance functions as the main source of protection from such risks because it can make up for
losses directly and effectively.4
D&O insurance was first introduced in the U.S. soon after the Securities Act of 1933
(“1933 Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”). Today, most public
corporations in the U.S. purchase D&O insurance to protect directors and officers, as well as the
corporation itself.5 Moreover, as the risk of securities litigation increases after the enactment of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, it has become essential that corporations purchase insurance for
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

See AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), EXECUTIVE AND ORGANIZATION LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY § 1 (Feb.
2000), http://www.chartisinsurance.com/Public-Company-Directors-and-Officers-Insurance-DandO22000_295_195857.html (U.S. D&O policy) This link leads to Chartis’ website because AIG General Insurance has
changed its name to “Chartis.” Reuters, American International Group, Inc. (AIG.N),
http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=AIG.N&WTmodLoc=NewsArt-C1-ArticlePage1;
See also HYUN DAI HAE SANG [HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS.], IM WON BAE SANG CHAEK IM BO HUM YAK KWAN
[DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY AND COMPANY REIMBURSEMENT POLICY] § 2,
http://b2b.hi.co.kr/file/prd/compen/pro_01_1.pdf (last visited June 1, 2009) (Korean version of D&O policy); See
also HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS., DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY AND COMPANY REIMBURSEMENT POLICY
§ 1, http://b2b.hi.co.kr/file/prd/compen/pro_01_2.pdf (last visited June 1, 2009) (English version of D&O policy).
2
See Joseph P. Monteleone, Recent Significant and Decisions in Securities Litigation and Related Disputes
Affecting D&O Insurers, 1692 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 753 (2008).
3
JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 899 (5th ed. 2000).
4
Carolyn H. Rosenberg, Insurance Coverage and Securities Litigation Resolution, N98SLIB A.B.A.
CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 9 (1998).
5
Joseph P. Monteleone, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and
Other Topical Issues, SH077 A.L.I-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 313 (2002).

1

directors and officers and that these officials identify the limits of the protection.6 In particular,
the recent litigation for losses arising from subprime lending in the U.S. has prompted an interest
in D&O insurance issues.7 Until recently, however, the judicial guidance in this area was not
sufficient, and many of the issues involved in D&O insurance coverage remained unsolved. In
light of such problems, it is necessary to reassess the current D&O insurance system in order to
provide financial protection to directors and officers as well as encourage capable and
responsible individuals to accept positions in corporate management.8
As the financial risk of securities litigation increases after the Korean economic crisis,
D&O insurance is considered a significant issue in Korea as well.9 The D&O insurance system
was introduced to Korea in 1991.10 The need for insurance, however, was not emphasized until
the Korean economic crisis in 1997, when the first shareholders’ lawsuits in Korea were brought
against Korea First Bank.11 The risk of shareholder litigations triggered interest in D&O

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

See JOHN F. OLSON ET AL., DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 1:1,
at 1-6 to -7 (2003).
7
See John F. McCarrick, Subprime Claims: D&O and E&O Liability and Coverage Implications, 775
PRACTISING L. INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 299, 303 (2008); Id. at 305-06 (explaining
that claims are made against corporate managers for “breaches of fiduciary duty or violations of federal or state
securities laws in managing or disclosing the corporation’s financial exposure to subprime losses.”); Donna L.
Wilson, Insurance Coverage Issues in the Subprime Credit Context: Bankrupcy, Insurance, and the Subprime
Lender, 1668 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 855, 859 (2008) (explaining that
subprime lenders may face “suits by borrowers alleging violations of federal credit laws and state consumer
protection statutes…shareholder suits alleging violation of the securities laws…and issuer/underwriter suits alleging
a failure to buy back loans…suits brought by state attorneys general”).
8
Seth Van Aalten, D&O Insurance in the Age of Enron: Protecting Officers and Directors in Corporate
Bankuptcy, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 457, 460 (2003).
9
See Jong-Sung Eun, Im won deung eui Bae sang chaek im bo hum gum yung sang poom ye Kwan han Bub
juk Go chal [A Study on the Director’s and Officer’s Liability Insurance], SANG POOM HAK EYUN GU JE24KWON
1HO [J. OF COMMODITY SCI. & TECH. VOL. 24-1] 23, 24 (2006).
10
Jin-Hee Hong, Im won bae sang chaek im bo hum yak kwan sang We bub haeng we myun chaek sa you
eui Hae suk kwa Je moon je [Construction and Several Problems of Conduct Exclusions in the Director’s and
Officer’s Liability Policy], KI UP BUB EYUN GU JE21KWON JE4HO(TONG KWON JE31HO) [BUS. L. VOL.21-4(31)] 181,
182 (2008).
11
Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 2: Court Procedures,
Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency),
2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 84 (2008).
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insurance in South Korea.12 Furthermore, the Korean government reduced the requirements for
shareholder derivative suits in 1998 and established a U.S.-style securities class action system in
2004.13 Having seen the abuse of securities class action in the U.S., Korean corporations feared
potential losses and began to purchase D&O insurance for their officers and directors.14
In addition, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2007, followed by the
Korean Foreign Legal Consultants Act, which was enacted in 2009. These acts allowed U.S. law
firms to establish offices in Korea.15 As a result, a number of U.S. law firms with class action
knowledge and experience will be able to work in Korea.16 Only one securities class action
lawsuit has ever been filed in Korea, even though the law permiting securities class actions was
enacted in 2004.17 One possible reason for this inactivity is that Korean law firms avoid
representing clients in shareholder initiated lawsuits where the corporation may be a prospective
client.18 Furthermore, smaller Korean law firms cannot advance litigation expenses or bear the
monetary losses resulting from losing the suit.19 It is expected, however, that the amount of class
action filing will increase because U.S. law firms, unrelated to Korean corporations, will
represent plaintiffs once Korean legal markets are open to them.20 As a result, Korean corporate
directors and officers will be pushed into the financial risk of securities litigation. Under these

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Eun, supra note 9, at 24.
Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1508-09 (2004).
14
Eun, supra note 9, at 24.
15
Rahn Kim, Foreign Lawyers to Provide Limited Service, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/02/117_18564.html. However, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement is not yet approved by their respective congresses. Kyungho Choi, Korean Foreign Legal Consultants
Act: Legal Profession of American Lawyers in South Korea, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 100, 102 (2010). Thus,
“[d]espite enactment of the [Foreign Legal Consultants] Act, U.S. lawyers and law firms need to wait until the
ratification of the [Agreement] by both couties in order to benefit from the [Act].” Id.
16
See Kim, supra note 15; Choi, supra note 15, at 102-04.
17
Kim Rahn, First Class-Action Suit in Offing, KOREA TIMES, June 25, 2009,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/113_47475.html.
18
Black et al., supra note 11 at 22.
19
Id.
20
See id.; Choi, supra note 13 at 1517; Kim, supra note 15.
13
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circumstances, it will be essential for large corporations to purchase D&O insurance in Korea as
well.21
Despite the apparent need, the Korean legal system is not prepared to address the issues
surrounding D&O insurance.22 In addition, Korean courts do not have sufficient experience in
this kind of insurance practice.23 This is inferred from the following facts: first, the Korea
Commercial Act does not provide standards for D&O insurance.24 Thus, in disputes involving
D&O insurance, the court can rely only on policy forms used in practice.25 Second, there are
only three Supreme Court cases concerning D&O insurance in Korea since 1991.26 This lack of
statutes and prior cases makes it difficult for the court to decide on such matters. Third, D&O
policy in Korea exists in two forms: a Korean version and an English version.27 Not only are
these policies written in different languages but they also differ in content.28 The Korean version
is used only for domestically insured corporations.29 The English version is used for
corporations which need reinsurance by international insurers.30 The coexistence of these two
very different documents is a source of confusion.31
Unlike in Korea, a number of cases regarding D&O insurance have been decided in the
U.S., and controversial issues have provided many opportunities for the courts to set precedent.32
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21

See Hong, supra note 10, at 182.
See id. at 183.
23
See id.
24
Black et al., supra note 11, at 85.
25
Id.
26
See Dae bub won [Supreme Court] 2003 15297 (S.Korea); Dae bub won [Supreme Court] 2003 19053
(S.Korea); Dae bub won [Supreme Court] 2002 69259 (S.Korea); Jeong Seo, Im won bae sang chak im bo hum
[D&O Liability Insurance], MIN SA PAN RAE YEON GU XXIX [CIV. CASE REV. XXIX] 1079, 1084 (2007).
27
Eun, supra note 9, at 26.
28
See id.
29
Hong, supra note 10, at 181.
30
Id.
31
See Hyo Jun Park, Ee sa eui Chaek im Je han ye Kwan han Eyun gu [A Study on the Limitation of the
Director’s Liability], 150 (Dec. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Changwon National University).
32
See generally Robert H. Shulman et al., Hot Issues in D&O Insurance, 719 PRACTISING L. INST. LITIG. &
ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 205 (2005) (explaining current issues regarding D&O insurance).
22

4

The examination of the current issues concerning U.S. D&O insurance is helpful not only to the
U.S., but to Korea as well, because both countries have a number of common elements of D&O
policy. Moreover, the comparative study in this area will be useful to other countries governed
by civil law which plan to adopt U.S.-style D&O insurance systems.

B. Purpose and Synopsis

The purpose of this paper is to provide ways to better protect corporate directors and
officers from the burdens of securities litigation through a comparison of D&O insurance in the
U.S. and South Korea. As the financial risk of securities litigation increases, D&O insurance is
considered a significant issue not only in the U.S., but in Korea as well. Until recently, however,
the jurisprudence in this area was not developed; thus, many problems in this area of law remain
unresolved. This paper examines the current issues concerning D&O insurance in the U.S. and
South Korea, and provides recommendations for the Korean D&O insurance system by
referencing the U.S. D&O insurance system.
The body of this paper is composed of six chapters. Chapter I lays out the background
and purpose of this study. Chapter II discusses the role of D&O insurance in securities litigation.
This chapter addresses how D&O insurance protects directors, officers, and corporations from
the burdens of derivative litigation and class action litigation. It also deals with the relationship
between indemnification and D&O insurance. In addition, this chapter examines how D&O
insurers monitor corporate governance.
Chapter III provides an overview of the Korean D&O insurance system. This chapter
analyzes components of Korean D&O policy, including the scope of coverage and exclusion. It

5

compares and contrasts the two current versions of Korean D&O policy. The examination of
these policies is very meaningful because it is the basis for a potential solution to many of the
problems in Korean D&O insurance.
Chapter IV compares the U.S. and South Korean D&O insurance systems. This chapter
addresses controversial issues arising in the U.S. or South Korea: whether the corporation can
pay an insurance premium for officials, whether the insurance covers defense and settlement
costs, whether defense costs are advanced, and whether the insurers have an obligation to defend
the insured in securities litigations. In addition, this chapter discusses allocation issues and
coverage exclusions.
Chapter V offers recommendations for the reform of the Korean D&O insurance system.
The proposed reform is based on discussions in chapters II, III and IV. This chapter contains
suggestions regarding the reconsideration of mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance
information, the reform of the Korean Commercial Act, the reform of the contents of D&O
policy, and the specification of guidelines for D&O insurance coverage in litigation.

II.

The Role of D&O Liability Insurance in Securities Litigation

A. Protection Against the Burdens of Securities Litigation

6

Corporate directors and officers are exposed to securities litigation risks as a part of
normal business operations.33 During day-to-day management, they are subject to fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.34 If the officials violate their fiduciary duties, the
corporation may seek damages by bringing a lawsuit against them.35 Even if the corporation opts
not to initiate litigation, shareholders can often bring a derivative action against officials on
behalf of the corporation.36 Furthermore, shareholders may bring a securities class action
directly against directors and officers if their acts constitute securities fraud.37
This potential litigation risk may discourage directors and officers from actively
managing their business.38 Without adequate protection from personal liability, talented
individuals may not be willing to work as directors or officers, realizing that the rewards may not
be worth the risks.39 D&O insurance is designed to avoid such risks and to allow talented
executives to have top positions within corporations.40 The fundamental purpose of D&O
insurance is to protect individual directors and officers from the costs of litigation,41 and thus it
functions as the main source of protection from such risks.42
However, the protections offered by D&O insurance are not limited to individual
directors and officers; D&O insurance also protects the corporation itself from securities

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33

See Aalten, supra note 8, at 457.
CHARLES R.T. O’KELLY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 235 (5th ed. 2006).
35
Id. at 237.
36
Id.
37
See JOHN H. MATHIAS, JR. ET AL., DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY : PREVENTION, INSURANCE AND
INDEMNIFICATION § 3.01, at 3-3 (2002); See also Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’
and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlement, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 764 (2009).
38
Matthew Benjamin, Risky Business: Life in the Executive Suite is Taking a Sour Turn, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Sept. 9, 2002, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/020909/archive_022500.htm.
39
See id.
40
See Aalten, supra note 8, at 460.
41
Id. at 470.
42
Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 9.
34

7

litigation burdens.43 Ultimately, the protective function of D&O insurance is accomplished
through three types of coverage: Side A, Side B, and Side C.44 Side A coverage directly protects
individual directors and officers; Side B coverage reimburses the corporation; and Side C
coverage protects the corporation itself.45 Although Side B appears to cover the corporation, the
fundamental purpose of covering indemnification is to protect individual directors and officers.46
Side A coverage is the personal part of D&O insurance.47 This coverage protects
individual directors and officers by insuring against loss where the corporation does not
indemnify its managers.48 In particular, the insurer will pay managers for loss under Side A
coverage when the corporation refuses to or cannot indemnify them due to a derivative action or
a corporation’s insolvency.49
Side B coverage is the portion of D&O insurance which offers company
reimbursement.50 This coverage does not apply to directors and officers, but rather the
corporation, for it reimburses the corporation for expenses to indemnify its directors and
officers.51 Side B coverage arises only when the corporation indemnifies its directors and
officers.52 The scope of coverage is also limited to the extent of indemnification.53 Thus, if
corporate managers cannot be indemnified, then Side B coverage is not allowed.54
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43

David B. Parker, The Role of Liability Insurance in Securities Litigation, 491 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP.
L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 373 (1985).
44
Sean J. Griffith, Uncorvering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details
Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1164-65 (2006).
45
Id. at 1163-67.
46
See Aalten, supra note 8, at 470.
47
WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 23.02,
at 23-3 (7th ed. 2006).
48
AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1; See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 23-3.
49
See John Collen, Bankruptcy and D&O Insurance, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 121, 122 (Jan.-Feb. 2002);
Griffith, supra note 44, at 1166.
50
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 23-3.
51
See AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1(ii); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 23-3.
52
Griffith, supra note 44, at 1165.
53
See AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1(ii).
54
See Griffith, supra note 44, at 1165.
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Side C coverage is the corporate liability part of D&O insurance.55 This coverage
protects the entity itself by insuring loss from claims made against the corporation.56 Side C is
not traditionally included as part of the coverage.57 Thus, the corporation itself is not protected
unless the policy stipulates that the corporation’s losses be covered.58 Currently, however, a
number of D&O policies include the entity coverage.59
However, a concern involved with most insurance policies is known as the “moral
hazard” problem, which addresses carelessness on the part of the insured.60 D&O insurance also
invites this problem because protecting corporate directors and officers from the burdens of
securities litigation may encourage lax behavior on the part of management.61 Securities
litigation is designed to prevent the misconduct of managers,62 while D&O insurance is intended
to protect the managers from the litigation burdens.63 Therefore, D&O insurance could weaken
the deterrent function of securities litigation and increase corporate misconduct.64
In light of this problem, D&O insurers have taken various measures to prevent moral
hazards.65 First, most D&O insurers incorporate deductibles in their coverages.66 Therefore, if a
claim is made against a director or an officer, the individual official or the company is obligated
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55

Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 12.
AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1(i); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 23-4.
57
See OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 12:20, 12:36; See also KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at
56

23-4.

58

See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 23-3.
Id. § 23.02, at 23-4.
60
See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238-39 (1996); See also Peter
Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives’ Defense Costs, and the Federal
Courts (Part I), 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 2 (2006), http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article/641/.
61
See Margulies, supra note 60.
62
Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 75, 78 (2008).
63
See Aalten, supra note 8, at 460.
64
See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ &
Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1817-19 (2007).
65
See id. at 1819-20.
66
See, e.g., CHUBB CORP., EXECUTIVE PROTECTION PORTFOLIO: DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY
COVERAGE SECTION § 7 (May 2007), available at
http://www.chubb.com/international/australia/csi/chubb4263.pdf; See also Baker & Griffith, supra note 64,
at 1819.
59
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to pay the deductible.67 Second, most D&O policies have coverage limitations.68 Therefore,
when actual losses exceed the coverage limits, the individual official must pay the excess loss.69
Third, D&O insurers attempt to discourage moral hazards by providing specific exclusions for
“dishonesty and fraud.”70 Finally, D&O insurers attempt to monitor managers in order to
prevent misconduct among directors and officers.71 This function of D&O insurance is expected
to mitigate the moral hazard problem because D&O insurers have the incentive and expertise to
effectively monitor a corporation.72 Part C of this chapter specifically addresses this monitoring
role.

B. The Relationship Between Indemnification and D&O Insurance

In the U.S., corporations are generally allowed to purchase D&O insurance for directors
and officers.73 In most states (other than New York74), corporations can purchase such coverage
whether or not they are able to indemnify their managers.75 Therefore, D&O insurance can

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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See Baker & Griffith, supra note 64, at 1819.
See, e.g., AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 5; CHUBB CORP., supra note 66, § 7; See also Baker &
Griffith, supra note 64, at 1819.
69
See Baker & Griffith, supra note 64, at 1819.
70
See, e.g., AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 4(c); CHUBB CORP., supra note 66, § 4.A(ix); See also
Baker & Griffith, supra note 64, at 1820; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 25.03, at 25-9.
71
See Clifford G. Holderness, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 115,
128 (1990).
72
John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the Quality of
Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 450 (2000); Griffith, supra note 44, at 1174.
73
See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.57 (2008).
74
See Bennett L. Ross, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and Other Alternatives, 40
VAND. L. REV. 775, 784-85 (1987) (explaining that the New York state restricts D&O coverage).
75
Id. at 784.
68
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protect directors and officers beyond the coverage of the indemnification.76 D&O insurance also
fills the void in instances where a corporation does not indemnify its managers.77
D&O insurance becomes more meaningful in circumstances where the corporation does
not provide indemnification.78 First, if directors and officers do not act “in good faith”79 or “in a
manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation,”80 or if directors have reasonable cause to believe the person’s conduct was
unlawful,81 then the directors and officers are not allowed to be indemnified.82 However, in the
absence of specific limitations in the policy, D&O insurance is able to cover these cases.83
Second, D&O insurance covers non-indemnifiable loss in situations involving derivative
actions and public policy prohibitions.84 In the case of derivative actions, corporations are not
allowed to indemnify managers for judgments or settlement sums, whereas D&O insurance can
reimburse them for sums paid.85 According to the Delaware General Corporation Law
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76
77

23-3.

Id.
See AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1; See also KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at

78

See OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 12:3, at 12-9 to -10.
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a), (b); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a)(1)(i).
80
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a), (b).
81
Id.
82
Id.; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a)(1).
83
See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g); See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.57.
84
See OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 12:3, at 12-10.
85
Compare DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a), with id. § 145(b); See also OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 5:19,
at 5-40. In addition, S. Samuel Arsht and Walter K. Stapleton commented on these provisions as follows:
79

It was ultimately determined that the statute should authorize only the indemnification of
litigation expenses and not of amounts paid in satisfaction of a judgment or in settlement of a claim. To
permit the corporation to nullify a judgment in its favor against a director simply by refunding the
director’s payment on it would, in the committee’s judgment, subvert the substantive provisions of the
corporation law and should not be permitted. With respect to payments in settlement of a derivative
action, it was the committee’s view that to permit such indemnification would have the ultimate effect
of discouraging settlements since, in such a situation, derivative plaintiffs could demonstrate no benefit
arising to the corporation from their action and, presumably, could not justify being reimbursed for
their litigation expenses, including counsel fees.
S. Samuel Arsht & Walter K. Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes,
23 BUS. LAW. 75, 79-80 (1967).
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(“Delaware G.C.L.”), although corporations are generally allowed to indemnify managers for
expenses, judgments, fines and settlement sums,86 in claims made “by or in right of the
corporation,” the indemnification is limited to expenses.87 However, the law does not contain
such limitations for D&O insurance.88 Therefore, expenses, as well as judgments and
settlements arising in derivative action are insurable.89
Furthermore, corporations are prohibited from indemnifying managers for violations of
the federal securities laws, but they are allowed to purchase insurance for their managers to cover
liabilities relating to these laws.90 For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) has not allowed indemnification for violation of the 1933 Act on the grounds that such
indemnification goes against public policy.91 According to the SEC, Congress primarily sought
to “stimulate diligence on the part of those persons who are actually responsible for the
preparation of registration statements” in the enactment of Section 11 of the 1933 Act.92
Therefore, “it is clearly contrary to public policy to allow directors to avoid any consequences
for their lack of diligence…by indemnification from the issuer.”93
In contrast, the SEC has considered insurance for liabilities under the 1933 Act
permissible, regardless of whether a corporation funds the insurance premiums.94 Although
public policy concerns about moral hazard have likewise been raised in the context of D&O
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insurance, the SEC has drawn a distinction between indemnification and insurance.95 While the
SEC has not provided specific reasons, it can be supposed that several issues have been taken
into consideration: that a qualified person is reluctant to serve as a manager without adequate
protection from the burdens of securities litigation;96 that recruiting a talented manager benefits
shareholder interests;97 that insurance premiums funded by a corporation are comparably small;98
that insurance coverage is already restricted under various exclusions and insurance laws;99 and
that insurers regularly monitor the conduct of managers to prevent moral hazards.100 Given these
considerations, it is understandable that the SEC draws distinctions between D&O insurance and
indemnification in the case of liabilities under the federal securities laws.101
Finally, D&O insurance serves an important function even when indemnification not
permissible.102 Only D&O insurance can cover losses when a corporation cannot afford to
indemnify directors and officers due to insolvency or financial problems.103 Moreover, some
corporations may not be legally obligated to indemnify managers shortly after a hostile
merger.104

C. Monitoring Corporate Governance
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D&O insurance is considered to have great potential to monitor corporate governance
because it regularly assesses D&O risks when determining premium amounts.105 This
monitoring role of D&O insurance may reduce the moral hazard problem because D&O insurers
have the incentive and expertise to prevent manager misconduct.106
Corporate governance is a crucial factor in establishing D&O premiums.107 Generally,
poor corporate governance tends to trigger securities litigation.108 Therefore, in order to avoid
claims on the policy, each insurance company uses its own assessment methods to assess D&O
risks before extending an insurance agreement.109 Each company’s goal is to accurately assess
the risk in order to calculate the proper insurance premium.110 D&O insurance companies,
therefore, classify corporations into two groups: 1) corporations with high risk corporate
governance and 2) corporations with low risk corporate governance.111
D&O insurers will cover companies with good corporate governance for low premiums,
whereas companies with poor corporate governance are required to pay high premiums.112 If
shareholders are able to effectively restrict the conduct of managers within a corporation, D&O
insurers will consider the corporation to have good governance.113 However, if shareholders are
not able to regulate managerial conduct, the corporation is considered to have poor
governance.114 Therefore, D&O premiums will be higher “when inside control of share votes is
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greater, when inside ownership is lower, when the board is comprised of fewer outside directors,
when the CEO has appointed more of the outside directors, and when inside officers have
employment contracts.”115 Such pricing mechanisms theoretically encourage corporations to
improve their corporate structures.116 This is because most corporations want to cut expenses by
eliminating factors which negatively affect governance.117
However, this mechanism may be problematic since the incentive to improve corporate
governance is not great enough.118 The expenses for improving governance structures may be
higher than the saved insurance premiums. Specifically, premiums have a weak influence on the
net income of a corporation, whereas governance reform involves the increase of “the costs of
regularly reviewing and revising internal governance policies—involving expensive legal and
financial advisors as well as the time and attention of the general counsel and top level
management.”119
Although premiums are not enough to compel corporations to improve their governance,
they may function as an indicator of corporate health, which could in turn affect stock price.120
Investors could take the premium amount into account when determining whether to purchase or
sell the corporation’s securities.121 Ideally, D&O insurance companies directly or indirectly
influence corporate structures by pricing insurance premiums based on corporate governance
practices.122
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Nevertheless, pricing mechanisms can also be problematic because most corporations are
unwilling to disclose their insurance premiums.123 It is extremely disadvantageous for a
corporation to be the first to disclose its premium, as it receives no benefit and may be giving
D&O policy information to other corporations.124
For this reason, Professor Sean Griffith at Fordham Law School suggests reforming
securities regulations for mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance information,125 such as D&O
insurance limits, coverage layers, and insurance premiums.126 Furthermore, the disclosure
should include “(1) the amount and structure of a corporation’s insurance coverage, and (2)
information on how settlement and defense costs are funded.”127
Despite Griffith’s recommendations, it is important to note that in the U.S., mandatory
disclosure of D&O insurance information may increase the likehood of securities lawsuits
against innocent insured corporations.128 The two main types of litigation are securities class
action and shareholders derivative action.129 When a company discloses increased insurance
premiums, securities lawsuits may be filed by shareholders who believe that increased premiums
tie directly to poor corporate management.130 However, D&O insurance premiums can increase
for various reasons, such as an insurance company’s financial problems, national financial crises,
or price fluctuations.
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Under Griffith’s proposal, insurance details should be disclosed even if the premium
increase results from factors unrelated to corporate health.131 High premiums or increased
premiums may lead shareholders to search for a cause of action in corporate governance
problems, and to file securities lawsuits.132 Even if claims are not based upon sufficient grounds,
officials are forced to defend themselves in order to prove their innocence. Defending claims is
very costly in terms of both time and money.133 Furthermore, as the defense process continues,
the defendant’s reputation worsens.134 In light of these facts, it is easy to see why defendants in
securities litigation prefer to settle out of court.135 As a result, an insurance company covering a
corporation or its officials must pay the settlement amounts regardless of liability.136
Mandatory disclosure of D&O policy information could exacerbate this problem.
Abusive securities litigation burdens both the insured and the insurer.137 Furthermore, even
though some propose the disclosure of these premiums in order to signal information about
corporate governance,138 such governance information is already available through other
channels, such as stock price and rating companies’ announcements. For this reason, disclosure
of D&O insurance policy information would be better left to each company’s discretion.

III.

Overview of D&O Liability Insurance in South Korea
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A. Versions of D&O Policy

There are two versions of D&O insurance policies in South Korea: a Korean version and
an English version.139 When D&O insurance was first introduced to Korea, only the English
version was used.140 Nevertheless, the English version was not suitable for the Korean legal
system because the English policy terms were partly inconsistent with Korean legal terms.141
Therefore, the Korean version of the D&O policy was developed in 1999.142 Yet the Korean
D&O Policy is not a mere translation of the English version. Rather, the Korean version
includes different content from that of the English version.143 Generally, the Korean version is
used only for domestically insured corporations.144 The English version is used for corporations
which need reinsurance by other international insurance companies.145

B. Insured
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1. Overview

In order to be protected under D&O liability insurance, claims must be brought against an
“insured.”146 Therefore, the definition of “insured” is important in determining whether the
D&O policy applies.147 D&O insurance traditionally covers only the individual directors and
officers, and the corporation which indemnifies them.148 However, some Korean policies
provide coverage for the corporation itself in some designated cases, such as securities claims.149

2. Directors and officers

Both the Korean and English versions of D&O liability insurance cover directors and
officers as the insured.150 In both versions, it is not possible to cover only one particular officer
as the insured because all of the officers are jointly liable for damages to the corporation.151
Thus, insuring a single manager results in protection of the other managers as well.152
The Korean version of D&O liability insurance adopts the same definition of directors as
the Korean Commercial Act, which states that directors shall be elected at a general
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shareholders’ meeting153 and that their names and residence numbers shall be registered.154 The
policy also permits individuals who have not undergone this formal process to be insured as long
as they are functioning as directors of a company.155 Therefore, officials who are not officially
registered as directors but engage in the day-to-day operations of a business can be covered
under D&O insurance.156 The policy requires all officials to be listed on the policy form.157 A
“director” or an “officer” not only includes current directors and officers, but also retired
managers and managers newly appointed during the insured period.158 A manager who retires
before the opening of the first policy period is excluded.159 If a manager dies, his heirs or legal
representatives are considered the insured.160 In bankruptcy, both a manager and a trustee are
considered as one insured entity.161 Furthermore, directors and officers of a subsidiary company
are insured because the Korean version includes coverage for not only the named company but
also its subsidiaries.162
The English version of D&O insurance is similar to the Korean version in that it provides
coverage for “any past, present or future duly elected or appointed directors or officers of the
company,” and “all new directors and officers during the policy period of this policy.”163 In
addition, it covers “the estates, heirs, or legal representatives of deceased directors or
officers,”164 as well as “the legal representatives of directors or officers in the event of their
incompetence, insolvency or bankruptcy, who were directors or officers at the time of the
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wrongful acts upon which such claims are based were committed.”165 As a result, unlike the
Korean version, the English verison protects the estates of deceased officials as insureds.166
Similarly, in the event of incompetence or insolvency, the legal representatives of such officials
are insured.167 Like the Korean version, the English version covers directors and officers of
subsidiaries.168

3. The corporation

The corporation may also be included within the definition of “insured.”169 The English
version of D&O policy stipulates that two types of coverage be provided for corporations.170
The first type of coverage reimburses the corporation’s expenditures when the corporation
indemnifies its directors and officers.171 This provision is located in the common policy.172 The
second type of coverage provides entity coverage.173 It covers losses arising from securities
claims made against the company in a separate special clause rather than in the common
policy.174 Thus, this second type of coverage is optional. In order to protect the corporation as a
whole under the policy, each party must add the special clause to the common policy.175
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The Korean version also provides both company reimbursement coverage and entity
coverage.176 However, as opposed to the English version, the Korean version places both
coverage types in special clauses.177 Therefore, under the Korean version of D&O policy, not
only is entity coverage optional but company reimbursement coverage is too.
Thus, in either version of the policy, a corporation may be covered in one of two ways as
long as it satisfies the definition of a company.178 Both versions define “company” as including
not only the named corporation but also its subsidiaries.179 When a company obtains “more than
50% of the total issued and outstanding shares in another corporation,” the former is considered a
parent company and the latter is considered its subsidiary.180 In addition, if a parent company
and its subsidiary company have (or if the subsidiary has by itself) stock “more than 50% of the
total issued and outstanding shares in another corporation,” that other corporation is also
considered a subsidiary company.181 As a result, in D&O insurance, “company” means the
named company and its designated subsidiaries in the policy, as well as any newly created
subsidiaries acquired after the effective date of D&O insurance.182 If a subsidiary company has
its own subsidiary, it is also covered under the policy.183

C. Covered Risk
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In order to be protected under D&O insurance, a “claim” must be made during the policy
period because Korean D&O insurance is a claims-made insurance.184 Non-D&O insurance
policies are generally based upon occurrence, meaning that the insurer is not obligated to cover
loss unless it occurs during the policy period even if claims are made after the policy period.185
In contrast, D&O insurance operates on a claims-made basis, because it is difficult to place a
time period on when directors and officers act and when the damages are established.186 For this
reason, D&O coverage is triggered when claims are first made against directors and officers.187
The Korean D&O policy does not define “claim,” which may trigger legal disputes
regarding D&O insurance coverage.188 It is not clear whether “claim” embraces a civil, criminal,
administrative, regulatory, or arbitration proceeding for monetary, non-monetary or injunctive
relief.189 In particular, it is questionable whether Korean Financial Supervisory Services
investigations are covered as a type of claim. When a regulatory agency such as the Financial
Supervisory Service begins investigating directors and officers or a corporation, the proceedings
may cause officials or the corporation to incur substantial defense costs.190 Therefore, disputes
may occur concerning whether or not administrative investigations are covered under D&O
policy.
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In addition, under the Korean D&O policy, the insured should notify the insurer shortly
after claims are brought against the insured.191 The notice generally includes the allegation, “the
names of claimants and the manner in which the insureds first became aware of the claim.”192
The notification requirement is considered to be satisfied when the notice is mailed.193

D. Coverage

In order to be protected under D&O insurance, the insured should have “losses” as a
D&O policy typically provides coverage only for losses arising from claims made against
insureds.194 “Loss”, as covered in the English version of the D&O policy, includes damages,
judgments, settlements and defense costs.195 This section stipulates that the term “loss” excludes
“civil or criminal fines or penalties imposed by law, punitive or exemplary damages, the
multiplied portion of multiplied damages, [and] taxes,”196 as well as “any amount for which the
insureds are not financially liable or which are without legal recourse to the insureds, or matters
which may be deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this policy shall be
construed.”197
Under the Korean version of the D&O policy, “loss” includes legal damages and defense
costs.198 It does not explicitly mention judgments or settlements, which creates difficulties in
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interpreting the scope of the damages.199 However, “legal damages” in the Korean version is
considered to include judgments because the purpose of D&O insurance is to cover loss arising
from claims, and judgments are the typical results of such claims. Furthermore, “legal damages”
may include settlements because admitting or assuming liability for damages entails settling.200
The Korean version of the policy allows the insured to admit liability for damages with the prior
written consent of the insurer.201 However, in the Korean version, “loss” does not cover taxes,
penalties, fines, punitive or exemplary damages, the multiplied portion of multiplied damages, or
damages increased on an agreement.202 Unlike the English version, it excludes damages
increased on an agreement, and it does not exclude “any amount for which the insureds are not
financially liable or which are without legal recourse to the insureds, or matters which may be
deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this policy shall be construed.” 203

E.

Exclusion

In order to be protected under D&O insurance, a claim should not fall under any
exclusion in the policy.204 Both the Korean and English versions of D&O policy contain
exclusions.
The English version of D&O policy stipulates that the insurer shall not be liable to cover
loss if claims are involved in (a) personal profit or advantage,205 (b) dishonest or criminal acts,206
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(c) return of remuneration without shareholders’ approval,207 (d) insider trading profits,208 (e)
commissions, political payments, and gratuities,209 (f) prior acts, or prior or pending litigation,210
(g) discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants,211 (h) directorship or officership for any
other entity,212 (i) nuclear material,213 (j) bodily injury, emotional injury, property damages, and
personal injury,214 (k) subsidiary officers’ or directors’ wrongful acts occurring at any time when
the subsidiary requirement is not satisfied,215 and (l) derivative action.216 Moreover, the English
version of the D&O policy has special exclusion clauses including the Punitive Damage
Exclusion Clause, Nuclear Energy Liability Exclusion Clause, Prior Acts Exclusion Clause,
Failure to Maintain Insurance Exclusion Clause, Captive Insurance Company Exclusion Clause,
Regulatory Exclusion Clause, SEC Exclusion Clause, ERISA Exclusion Clause, Year 2000
Exclusion Clause, Professional Services Liability Exclusion Clause, Insured v. Insured Exclusion
Clause, Closely-Held Clause, Financial Institution Clause, and Bankruptcy Exclusion.217
The Korean version of the D&O policy stipulates that the insurer shall not be liable to
cover loss if claims are involved in (a) personal profit or advantage,218 (b) dishonest or criminal
acts,219 (c) return of remuneration without shareholders’ approval,220 (d) insider trading profits,221
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(e) commissions, political payments, and gratuities,222 (f) prior acts, or prior or pending
litigation,223 (g) discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants,224 (h) nuclear material,225 (i)
bodily injury, emotional injury, property damages, and personal injury,226 (j) subsidiary officers’
or directors’ wrongful acts occurring at any time when the subsidiary requirement is not
satisfied,227 (k) insured v. insured,228 (l) closely-held clause,229 (m) directorship or officership for
any other entity,230 (n) derivative action.231 Moreover, it has special exclusion clauses including
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act exclusion, the Regulatory Exclusion Clause,
the Year 2000 Exclusion Clause, the Financial Institution Clause, the Failure to Maintain
Insurance Exclusion clause, and the Securities and Exchange Act Exclusion.232

IV.

Comparison of U.S. and South Korean D&O Liability Insurance

A.

Purchasing Insurance

The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) and Delaware G.C.L. permit a
corporation to purchase and maintain D&O insurance for directors and officers notwithstanding a
corporation’s ability to indemnify.233 In most U.S. jurisdictions, therefore, a corporation can
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legally provide insurance for directors and officers.234 Moreover, under the Delaware G.C.L.,
the board of directors is entitled to determine the compensation for directors.235 Thus, in the U.S.,
the board of directors can commit to paying D&O insurance premiums, even if the payments
become part of the compensation.236
The Korean Commercial Act does not provide any standards for D&O insurance.237 Thus,
the legal theory in this area is not sufficient, and many problems remain unresolved. One of the
controversial issues is whether or not a corporation has the right to purchase such insurance on
behalf of directors and officers.238
Some argue that a corporation should be allowed to purchase D&O insurance on behalf
of the directors and officers239 in order to guarantee reimbursement of any losses accrued on
behalf of the corporation.240 This policy of reimbursement benefits the entire corporate entity241
and allows directors and officers to work more actively for the corporation.242 Furthermore,
some argue that the Korean Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act indirectly permits a
corporation to buy insurance for its officials by excluding D&O insurance premiums from the
income tax list.243
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Others argue that a corporation should not pay D&O insurance premiums on the grounds
that such expenses cause a loss to the corporation, and thus, the decision to pay those premiums
violates the fiduciary duty of the directors.244 Moreover, it is often argued that free D&O
coverage encourages managers to be imprudent in their business judgment because they are then
free to rely on the insurance policy to cover their mistakes.245 Thus, the U.S. concern about
moral hazard is likewise present in Korea.
Furthermore, corporate funding for D&O insurance may violate the Korean Commercial
Act, which requires consent from all shareholders in order to dismiss managers from
responsibility.246 The Korean Commercial Act stipulates that directors are liable for the loss to
their corporation when they neglect their duty or violate laws or by-laws.247 In order to
discharge such directors from liability, the entirety of the company’s shareholders must consent
to the exemption.248 If a corporation purchases D&O insurance for its officials, the corporation,
in effect, renounces any future claims against officials.249 Purchasing the insurance policy
without any consent indirectly violates the Korean Commercial Act Article 400.250
Of the two arguments presented above, the former appears to be more persuasive because
it accurately reflects the corporate world. A corporation needs to pay insurance premiums in
order to attract qualified officials. Such insurance coverage is not only advantageous for
officials, but also for the entire corporate entity. Second, there is no violation of Article 400 of
the Korean Commercial Act even if a corporation purchases the insurance without consent of its
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shareholders, as exemption from liability is distinguished from payment when liability is
established.251 Therefore, although it is necessary to limit the potential abuse of corporate
expenses for D&O insurance, the requirement under Article 400 does not apply in the purchase
of insurance policies. Instead, the concept of compensation, which includes basic salary,
incentives, and life insurance premiums, could be considered.252 Similar to life insurance
premiums, D&O insurance premiums would also be considered as part of an official’s
compensation.253 Thus, Article 388 of the Korean Commercial Act (as opposed to Article 400)
applies to insurance premiums.254 As a result, a corporation can legally purchase the insurance
for its directors and officers if the insurance premium funding is approved by “affirmative votes
of a majority of the voting rights of shareholders present thereat and representing at least 1/4 of
the total issued and outstanding shares” in a shareholder’s meeting.255

B.

The Scope of Coverage

1. Defense Obligation

Controversy exists concerning the defense of litigation in D&O coverage.256 The first
and most basic issue is whether the insurers have an obligation to defend in securities
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litigation.257 The second issue is whether the insurance covers defense costs.258 If so, the last
crucial issue becomes whether defense costs are advanced.259
Because corporations and managers want to control the defense process, such as choice
of counsel and settlement,260 the typical U.S. D&O insurance policy provides that the insurer is
not subject to any defense obligation.261 For similar reasons, the Korean D&O policy also
refuses to impose a duty to defend upon the insurer.262
Generally, instead of a duty to defend, the insurer has a duty to pay.263 Exactly when
such costs should be paid is a significant issue that must be outlined in the insurance
agreement.264 Requiring insurance companies to advance defense costs is often beneficial.265
The insurance company may incur huge financial losses when directors and officers cannot
afford to defend themselves and thus fail in their defense.266 Because of such risks, U.S. D&O
policies began to provide the option to advance defense costs in each case.267 For example, the
insurance policy in Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corp stated that “[t]he Insurer may at its option
and upon request, advance…expenses which they have incurred in connection with claims made
against them, prior to disposition of such claim[s]….”268
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This option to advance costs is problematic because it places the insurer as the holder of
the option.269 In Okada, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals resolved the issue regarding the
option to advance defense costs by interpreting the policy terms in favor of the insured.270 The
court found that legal defense costs should be paid contemporaneously unless the policy
obviously provides for the exclusion.271 Therefore, the insurer should pay defense costs as they
are incurred when the policy terms are vague and the insured could reasonably believe that the
insurer would pay attorney fees contemporaneously.272
In Okada, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant should pay defense costs concurrently
on the grounds that the costs were covered under the policy.273 However, the defendant
countered that the D&O policy did not guarantee contemporaneous payment of litigation
expenses274 because the policy terms provided that the insurer would pay defense costs
immediately only when the insured obtained the insurer’s approval to such coverage.275 The
court held that the insurer should pay defense costs as they were incurred when the insured could
reasonably believe they would receive contemporaneous payment of litigation expenses and the
policy did not mention otherwise.276 This holding is based upon the general insurance principle
that policy terms should be construed in favor of the insured when the terms are vague.277
Okada had a significant influence on the U.S. insurance market.278 After Okada, a
number of D&O policies started to explicitly state that defense costs could not be advanced or
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that the insured had the right to choose to receive defense costs in advance.279 Ultimately, the
policies provided that defense costs be advanced automatically if the insured corporation could
not assume the defense costs.280 Furthermore, most current D&O policies advance defense costs
whether or not an insured corporation pays the expenses: 281 “…the Insurer shall
advance…covered Defense Costs no later than ninety (90) days after the receipt by the Insurer of
such defense bills.”282
Similar to the practice in the U.S., Korean D&O coverage generally entails defense costs
under the Korean Commercial Act.283 The Act stipulates that liability insurance covers defense
costs.284 However, the Act does not provide for exactly when defense costs are to be paid, and
thus the timing of payment depends upon the terms of each policy.285 Korean D&O policy
provides that the insurance company “may” advance defense costs and that there is “no duty to
reimburse defense costs prior to the final disposition of the claim.”286 Therefore, the timing of
the advance is fully dependent upon the discretion of the insurer.287 If the insurer refuses to
advance the expenses, the directors and officers have to defend the lawsuit at their own
expense.288
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Current Korean D&O coverage raises issues similar to those in Okada289 because Korean
insurance companies desire to be in the more favorable position.290 For example, a multinational
insurance company, such as the American Home Assurance Company Korea,291 takes the
advantage by using a different policy form in Korea.292 The policy used in Korea gives the
insurer the option to advance defense costs, whereas the common practice now in the U.S. is to
provide automatic advancement of defense costs.293

2. Settlement

Settlement is a significant issue arising in D&O insurance because most securities
lawsuits are settled before adjudication.294 Generally, U.S. D&O policy provides coverage for
settlement as part of a loss.295 The English version of Korean D&O policy also clearly states that
it covers settlements.296 However, the Korean version merely provides for legal damages and
defense costs, and does not mention settlement sums.297 The question then becomes whether the
legal damages include judgment as well as settlement sums under the Korean version of D&O
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policy.298 In Korea, D&O professionals, making inferences from other provisions that allow the
insured to admit liability for damages with the prior written consent of the insurer,299 consider
settlements to be covered under the current policy.300 However, in order to protect the insured,
specifications regarding settlement costs need to be added to the Korean version’s coverage
provisions.
The typical U.S. D&O policy also requires that the insured obtain the insurer’s written
consent prior to settlement.301 The purpose of the consent is to protect an insurer from a
conspiracy between parties or lawyers, which could disadvantage the insurers.302 In order to
prevent ethical violations, Korean D&O policies also provide a consent requirement.303 Such a
requirement protects the insurer from having to pay uncovered claims.304 If the insured settles
without the insurer’s consent, the insurance company does not have to cover the losses.305
It is questionable exactly when this “prior” approval must be obtained.306 In Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Great American Insurance Co., the court found that consent was required before settling a
claim, but not before a settlement was offered.307 In that case, the plaintiff argued that the
insurer should cover the entire settlement amount under the D&O policy.308 However, the
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defendant countered that the insured violated the policy terms by making a settlement offer
without the insurer’s consent, and thus the insured was no longer entitled to reimbursement for
the settlement.309 Furthermore, the insurer contended that the settlement offer was unreasonably
high.310 The court found that the insured was not required to receive the insurer’s consent prior
to the offer of settlement.311 The D&O policy only compelled the insured to obtain the insurer’s
consent before the final settlement.312
Prior consent from the insurer is designed to prevent collusion between parties or
lawyers.313 However, it is questionable whether the consent requirement achieves this goal as,
under U.S. D&O policy, the insurer cannot withhold consent without reasonable grounds.314 If
the company fails to offer consent for a settlement, it is possible that it “could be liable for the
entire judgment that results, not just the limits of the D&O insurance policy.”315
The English version of Korean D&O policy also provides that “The Insurer’s consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld…”316 However, the Korean version does not provide for
such limits to consent.317 This gives an unreasonably advantageous position to an insurance
company when claims occur.
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3. Allocation

The purpose of D&O insurance is to cover either the loss of individual directors and
officers when they are not indemnified by their corporation, or the loss of a corporation that
indemnifies its directors and officers.318 D&O insurance does not aim to protect a corporation
itself from the loss caused by claims made against the entity in principle.319 Therefore, an
insurance company can claim allocation between covered officers and the uncovered entity.320
As a result, even if directors and officers procure losses arising from claims covered under the
policy, they sometimes face an unexpected decrease in D&O coverage.321 Such curtailment of
coverage is caused in part by allocations between covered and uncovered parties or matters.322
Two common law standards exist concerning the allocation of settlement sums.323 The
first standard is the rule of relative exposure.324 This rule was adopted in Pepsi Company
Incorporated v. Continental Casualty Company, which required that relative faults should be
assessed when allocating the settlement amount.325
In this case, the insured, PepsiCo, contended that the insurer, Continental, should cover
the entire sum of the settlement because the directors and officers were solely liable and covered
by Continental.326 Although Continental agreed to the settlement, it rebutted that it was not
obligated to cover the full amount.327 Continental claimed that the settlement should be allocated
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to each defendant because the policy states that “it covers only the directors and officers of
PepsiCo, not the corporation and not its accounting firm.”328 The court found that Continental
was entitled to “allocate the settlement costs between those amounts attributable to the directors
and officers and those attributable to PepsiCo and its accountants.”329
However, under the relative exposure rule, the allocation all too often turns on subjective
standards.330 Thus, some courts have followed an alternative rule: the larger settlement rule.331
The larger settlement rule, first adopted in Harbor Insurance Co. v. Continental Bank
Corp., states that the insurer is obligated only to pay the portion of the settlement caused by an
insured person.332 In this case, the court held that the insurer was entitled to an allocation of the
settlement only when the wrongful act of an uninsured party increased the settlement amount.333
The trial court found that the entire settlement amount should be allocated to Continental.334
However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision by holding that the entire
settlement amount should be allocated to the directors.335 According to the Seventh Circuit, the
insurers were obligated to reimburse the insured for the settlement, excluding the portion of the
settlement caused by an uninsured person.336 Furthermore, the court found that allocating the
settlement “between the directors’ liability and the corporation’s derivative liability for directors’
act”337 impedes the function of D&O insurance and makes it meaningless.338
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After Harbor, the court adopted this rule in Caterpillar as well.339 The Caterpillar court
followed the reasoning of Harbor, based on the larger settlement rule.340 According to the
court’s decision, the insurer could allocate the settlement and “[t]hat allocation may only reflect
the extent to which the settlement was larger because of claims against uninsured persons or the
actions of persons against whom no claims were made.”341
Most modern U.S. D&O policies provide allocation standards in order to avoid the
above-mentioned legal disputes.342 American International Group (“AIG”) D&O policy
stipulates that “[parties]…agree to use their best efforts to determine a fair and proper allocation
of the amounts…taking into account the relative legal and financial exposures, and the relative
benefits obtained by any such Insured and any such Organization.”343 Chubb D&O policy
provides for an arbitration process in allocation disputes.344 However, these provisions still
contain many opportunities for legal disputes in allocation because they depend largely upon
subjective matters and negotiations between parties.345 Therefore, some insurers provide entity
coverage provisions or pre-determined allocation provisions, in order to reduce the possibility of
disputes regarding allocation in advance.346
Korean D&O policy also states that parties should cooperate for fair and proper
allocation but does not indicate any specific allocation method.347 The “fair and proper”
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standard is extremely vague.348 Thus, the allocation process often faces the same problems with
subjectivity and negotiation as the AIG and Chubb D&O policies.349 Therefore, Korean D&O
policy needs to provide more specific standards for allocation.

C. Insured v. Insured Exclusion

A typical U.S. D&O policy contains an insured v. insured exclusion.350 This exclusion
precludes coverage for claims made by a corporation against insured officials or by an insured
official against another insured official.351 Under this exclusion, a corporation is not allowed to
transfer loss arising from management mistakes to a D&O insurance company by bringing an
action against insured directors and officers.352 Therefore, the corporation cannot collect the
insurance in order to ease a shortage of cash.353
Korean D&O policy also contains an insured v. insured exclusion.354 The English
version precludes “any claim made against the insureds which is brought by any insured or the
subsidiary or affiliate of the company, or any security holder(s) of any of the above entities...”355
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This provision is located in a separate special clause.356 However, the Korean version places the
insured v. insured exclusion within the common policy.357
In addition, U.S. D&O policy does not allow this exclusion to apply when “such [a]
security holder’s or member’s Claim is instigated and continued totally independent of, and
totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active participation of, or intervention of,
any Executive of an Organization or any Organization.”358 However, Korean D&O policy does
not state this exception to the exclusion.359

V.

Recommendations for the Reform of the Korean D&O Liability
Insurance System

A. Reconsideration of Mandatory Disclosure of D&O Insurance Information

Chapter II of this paper revealed that the U.S. does not require a corporation to disclose
D&O policy information.360 A non-mandatory disclosure system is more suitable for the U.S.
because mandatory disclosure may trigger securities lawsuits against innocent insured
corporations.
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In contrast to the U.S., the Korean Financial Supervisory Service requires a reporting
company to disclose D&O insurance information in an annual report.361 Despite such mandatory
disclosure, securities litigation abuse has not yet been reported in Korea.362 However, securities
litigation risks have been increasing since the Korean government reduced the requirements for
shareholder derivative actions in 1998 and established a U.S.-style securities class action system
in 2004.363 Moreover, if Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreements are approved by their respective
congresses, a number of U.S. law firms with experience in private securities litigation may begin
work in Korea.364 Thus, changes in recent years may lead to reconsideration of mandatory
disclosure of D&O policies in Korea.

B. Recommendations for the Reform of the Korean Commercial Act

The Korean Commercial Act does not provide any standards for D&O insurance.365 The
only mention of such a standard occurs in the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, which
permits a corporation to buy the insurance for its officials by excluding D&O insurance
premiums from the tax list.366 This income tax provision, however, is only weakly linked to
D&O insurance regulations.367 Instead, it would be much more sensible to delineate D&O policy
in the corporate section of the Korean Commercial Act.368 In the U.S., even if insurance laws
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generally regulate insurance markets,369 corporate laws provide more specific regulations for
D&O insurance in consideration of corporate realities.370 For example, the MBCA and Delaware
G.C.L. state that a corporation may “purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of” corporate
directors or officers.371 These provisions reflect the corporate world, in which talented managers
are reluctant to serve as officials without an insurance policy purchased by a corporation. One
solution is to enact provisions that corporations may legally provide insurance for directors and
officers, and that the premiums be considered a kind of compensation for the officials under the
Korean Commercial Act.372 The proposed provision would be: “A corporation may purchase
and maintain insurance on behalf of its corporate directors or officers. The insurance fee shall be
considered a part of the compensation of these directors or officers.”373

C. Comments for the Reform of Contents in D&O Policy

1. Clarifying the Scope of Claims

Korean D&O policy, which does not define claims, may result in more legal disputes
regarding D&O insurance coverage than U.S. policies.374 In order to avoid this problem, Korean
D&O policy needs to clarify the scope of claims by defining them. For example, the American
AIG policy broadly defines “claim” as including “a written demand for monetary, non-monetary
or injunctive relief;” “a civil, criminal, administrative, regulatory or arbitration proceeding for
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monetary, non-monetary or injunctive relief;” or “a civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory
investigation of an insured person.”375 Some argue that such a broad definition is unwise
because it would allow criminal, administrative or regulatory proceedings to be insured, which
would violate public policy.376
However, there is no concern for violations of public policy under Korean D&O
insurance. This is because Korean policy excludes results from the aforementioned proceedings,
such as “taxes, civil or criminal fines or penalties, punitive or exemplary damages, the multiplied
portion of multiplied damages, or damages increased on an agreement.”377 Therefore, Korean
policy does not cover final judgments in criminal, administrative or regulatory proceedings.
Korean D&O policy merely covers the defense costs of such proceedings, which is permissible
under public policy.
Such a broad definition of D&O coverage could help avoid disputes regarding whether or
not administrative investigations are insured under D&O policy.378 D&O policies generally
cover losses from claims against directors and officers.379 Therefore, if such investigations fall
within claims, policies will cover investigation expenses as well.380 In Minute International, Inc.
v. Great American Insurance Co., the court broadly interpreted claims by holding that SEC
investigations should be insured under D&O policy.381 On the other hand, Minnesota courts
have narrowly interpreted claims.382 Similar to the U.S., in Korea, it could be questionable
whether policies cover the Korean Financial Supervisory Services investigations as a kind of
claim. Because the purpose of a D&O policy is to support individual directors and officers who
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cannot solely bear losses, “claims” need to be broadly interpreted to include expenses for the
Korean Financial Supervisory Services investigations.383 Moreover, similar to a lawsuit,
investigations take large amounts time and incur high expenses.384 Therefore, Korean D&O
policy would benefit from a broad definition of “claims.” This definition could be worded as
follows: “Claim refers to a written demand for monetary, non-monetary or injunctive relief; a
civil, criminal, administrative, regulatory or arbitration proceeding for monetary, non-monetary
or injunctive relief; or a civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory investigation of an insured
person.”385

2. Guaranteeing the Advancement of Defense Costs

Korean D&O policy gives the insurer the option of advancing defense costs by stating
that the insurance company “may” advance defense costs.386 Similarly, the Korean Commercial
Act does not impose upon the insurer the duty to advance defense costs. Instead, it merely states
that “the insured may demand from the insurer an advance payment of [defense] expenses.”387
If an insurer decides not to advance the expenses, the directors and officers then become
responsible for them.388 However, in the U.S. after Okada in 1986, a number of D&O policies
started to explicitly state that either defense costs could not be advanced or that the insured had
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the right to choose to receive defense costs in advance.389 Furthermore, many D&O policies
began to advance defense costs whether or not an insured corporation paid the expenses.390
Covering defense costs is a crucial part of D&O insurance. If the insurer does not cover
defense costs, most directors and officers cannot afford litigation expenses before a final decision
is reached.391 This may cause them to lose the lawsuit or settle even if they are not liable.392
Reimbursing defense costs after losing a lawsuit is futile, and discourages active corporate
management.393 For this reason, the advancement of defense costs ought to be guaranteed for the
insured. Therefore, it is recommended that Korean D&O policy contain an explicit provision
requiring the advancement of defense costs.394

3. Revising Settlement Provisions

The English version of Korean D&O policy defines “loss” to include amounts paid in
settlement.395 However, the Korean version merely provides for legal damages and defense
costs.396 It does not explicitly mention judgments or settlements, which means that insuring
against them depends entirely upon one’s interpretation.397 This could lead to disputes regarding
the insurer’s responsibility to cover settlement amounts.398 Therefore, the Korean version needs
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to clarify the scope of coverage by defining legal damages in a way which includes judgments
and settlements.
In the course of settlements, collusion sometimes occurs between parties or lawyers.399
Such collusion tends to disadvantage the insurers.400 Therefore, Korean D&O policy requires
that the insured obtain the insurer’s written consent prior to settlement.401 Without such written
consent, the insurance company is not obligated to reimburse loss.402 Both the U.S D&O policy
and the English version of Korean D&O policy guarantee the insured’s interest by not allowing
the insurer to withhold written consent for settlement unless the insurer has reasonable grounds
to do so.403 However, the Korean version does not provide this condition, which allows the
insurers to reject settlements whenever they choose.404 In order to protect the insured, the
Korean version ought to include a condition such as the following: “The insurer’s written
consent to settlement shall not be unreasonably withheld.”405

4. Providing Specific Allocation Standards

Korean D&O policies do not provide explicit allocation standards.406 They merely
stipulate that “parties cooperate for fair and proper allocation.”407 Such a statement is extremely
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vague, and may lead to legal disputes.408 In order to prevent such disputes, Korean D&O policy
needs to provide more specific standards for allocation.
Two kinds of common law allocation rulings exist in the U.S. D&O insurance system: a
relative exposure rule and a larger settlement rule.409 Between them, the larger settlement rule is
more suitable for a civil law system, such as the Korean legal system, because it is a more
objective standard than the relative exposure rule.410 Under the larger settlement rule,
“allocation may only reflect the extent to which the settlement was larger because of claims
against uninsured persons or the actions of persons against whom no claims were made.”411
However, the relative exposure rule depends entirely upon judicial discretion.412 Therefore, it is
suggested that Korean D&O policy include a provision requiring allocation to be based on larger
settlements.413 Otherwise, in an effort to avoid allocation disputes, both parties in an insurance
contract may make an agreement including entity coverage or a pre-determined allocation
percentage.414 As shown in Joseph P. Monteleone’s study, one model of the pre-determined
allocation could be stated as follows:
Allocation of Securities Claims. The Company, the Directors and/or Officers and
the Insurer agree to allocate to covered Loss the following portions of any Allocable
Amount incurred with respect to a Securities Claim:
A.
% of all Securities Claim Expenses; and
B.
% of all Securities Loss other than Securities Claim Expenses.
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This agreed allocation shall be final and binding on the Directors and/or Officers,
the Company and the Insurer.415

5. Limiting the Scope of the Insured v. Insured Exclusion

The main purpose of the insured v. insured exclusion is to prevent collusive or “friendly”
litigation designed to transfer money from the insurer to the corporation.416 If there is no
collusion involved in the claim, this exclusion should not apply.417 The insured is to be covered
under the policy when “such [a] security holder’s or member’s Claim is instigated and continued
totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active
participation of, or intervention of, any Executive of an Organization or any Organization.”418
However, Korean D&O policy does not identify exceptions for the exclusion.419 Thus, in cases
where collusion cannot arise, the insured is not covered under D&O policy.420 Such a problem
can easily be remedied by modeling the exclusion after the U.S. D&O policy terms.421 Therefore,
the insured v. insured exclusion ought to include an exception as follows: “The insured is to be
covered when a claim is made totally independent of any organization or its executives.”422
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D. Specification of Guidelines for D&O Insurance Coverage in Litigation

Defense costs are another area of potential controversy in Korea.423 The Korean
Commercial Act states that the insured may demand defense costs in advance. It also states that
if the insurer leads the defense, the insurer should pay the entire loss regardless of whether or not
the defense costs extend beyond the coverage.424 Specific processes, such as allocation, rely on
policy provisions.425 However, these policy provisions regarding allocation are too vague to
solve specific legal issues which may arise.426 In order to clarify these provisions, as mentioned
previously, some reform of the Korean Commercial Act and D&O policy is needed. However,
revision of current statutes and policies will take a great deal of time. Until such a revision of the
Korean Commercial Act and D&O policy can be made, the guidelines published by the Korean
Financial Supervisory Service in 2005 may be useful.427 However, these guidelines are not
sufficient to meet the demands of future D&O insurance disputes. Therefore, regulatory
institutions, such as the Financial Supervisory Service, ought to improve the guidelines. This
can be accomplished by utilizing the U.S. policies and common law which provide an example
of how to specify legal processes such as purchasing, coverage, defense costs, settlements,
allocations and exclusions.
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VI.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed D&O liability insurance system in the U.S. and South Korea
with particular emphasis placed on protection of corporate directors and officers from the
burdens of securities litigation. D&O liability insurance is a special insurance product which
covers loss arising from claims made against directors and officers.428 Corporate directors and
officers are subject to many responsibilities.429 If they breach these duties, they may be exposed
to huge financial risks arising from civil lawsuits, criminal proceedings or administrative
investigations. Among other things, such litigation and investigations can result in a tremendous
monetary loss to corporate officials. Because of these risks, many talented people may avoid
serving as corporate directors or officers. Thus, corporations often seek D&O protections to
assure that they find gifted individuals to manage their businesses. There are two types of D&O
protection: indemnification and insurance.430 Indemnification has many limitations.
Indemnification cannot support directors if they violate federal securities law and is based upon
on the corporation’s ability to pay. In contrast, insurance does not have such limitations. The
SEC considers D&O insurance to be lawful and permissible, and has not prevented corporations
from insuring against violations. Therefore, D&O insurance is the main source of protection for
directors and officers.
In the U.S., this insurance was introduced in the 1930’s.431 In Korea, major corporations
started to purchase the policy after the Asian economic crisis in 1997.432 In 2004, 34.4% of
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companies listed on the Korea Exchange maintained the policy.433 However, lack of experience
with D&O insurance may cause problems in operating the system.434
Most importantly, there is a “moral hazard” concern that D&O insurance could weaken
the deterrent function of securities law.435 However, D&O premiums may function as an
indicator of corporate health because D&O insurers monitor corporate financial condition and
corporate governance when deciding the coverage.436 Therefore, D&O insurance does not
interfere with the deterring role of corporate and securities law, but rather actually supports that
function.
Another concern about D&O insurance is that the Korea Commercial Act does not
provide any regulatory standards.437 Thus, controversy exists concerning whether or not a
corporation has the right to purchase such insurance on behalf of directors and officers. In order
to avoid disputes regarding the purchaser, this paper proposed that the Korea Commercial Act
provide explicit provisions to allow corporations to purchase D&O policy for directors and
officers.
A third concern is that Korean D&O policy has a Korean version and an English version.
The coexistence of the two different versions causes confusion in analysis and application of
Korean D&O policy. Therefore, some revision of its provisions is required. Among other things,
similar to the U.S. D&O policy and English version of the Korean policy, the Korean version
needs to clarify the scope of coverage by defining legal damages to include judgments and
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settlements.438 In addition, in order to protect the insured, the Korean version ought to guarantee
the insured’s coverage interest by not allowing the insurer to withhold written consent to
settlement unless the insurer has reasonable grounds to do so.
Another potential issue arises because practice with the insurance and relevant
jurisprudence is limited in Korea. However, in the U.S., a number of cases about D&O
insurance have been accumulated and discussed. Therefore, it is proposed that American
solutions to the issues arising in D&O insurance be applied in the Korean system. Among other
things, in order to avoid legal disputes in this area, Korean D&O policy needs to clarify the
scope of claims, the advancement of defense costs and the standards of allocation.439 Moreover,
in light of protecting the insured’s interest, the scope of the insured v. insured exclusion needs to
be limited. However, much time is necessary for such reform of current statutes and policies,440
and thus Korean regulatory institutions first need to improve their guidelines.
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